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GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judge. 
 
 This appeal stems from the controlled delivery of a 
parcel containing twenty pounds of marijuana (the “Parcel”) 
to the residence of Defendant-Appellant Corey Golson 
(“Golson”), where upon acceptance, state and federal law 
enforcement agents conducted a search of Golson‟s home 
pursuant to an anticipatory search warrant (the “Anticipatory 
Warrant”) issued by Pennsylvania Magisterial District Judge 
Mark Martin (“MDJ Martin”).  There are two primary issues 
to resolve. 
 
 First, Rule 41(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal 
Procedure mandates that either a federal judge or a judge of a 
state court of record must issue a warrant in a federal 
prosecution.  Golson claims, among other things, that the 
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government violated Rule 41(b) because MDJ Martin was not 
a judge of a state court of record.  In reviewing Golson‟s 
claim pursuant to a suppression motion, the United States 
District Court found that the Anticipatory Warrant was issued 
pursuant to an investigation under state law, which is not 
governed by the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.  We 
will affirm pursuant to United States v. Bedford, 519 F.2d 650 
(3d Cir. 1975).   
 Second, federal postal inspectors seized the Parcel for 
a period of four days prior to obtaining a warrant to open and 
search it.  Since a prolonged seizure occurred, Golson claims 
the contents of the Parcel should be suppressed.  The District 
Court found the seizure to be reasonable.  We agree and will 
affirm.  
I. BACKGROUND 
A. Factual Background 
 On Wednesday, July 21, 2010, a postal inspector at the 
Phoenix branch of the United States Postal Inspection Service 
(“USPIS”) intercepted the Parcel, which was being sent out of 
state, on suspicion of narcotics trafficking.  The Parcel was 
sent from “M. Tubbs” at an address in Phoenix, Arizona to 
“Derek Brown” at 237 West Locust Street, Mechanicsburg, 
PA 17055.
1
  
 A Phoenix USPIS postal inspector deemed the package 
as suspicious because the return address was fictitious and 
non-deliverable.  Additionally, based on his experience, drug 
                                                 
1
 The residence was later determined to be that of Golson.  
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traffickers often bring narcotics across the border from 
Mexico into Arizona, and then mail them to the east coast.  
(J.A. 250.)  
 Phoenix USPIS contacted postal inspector Joseph 
Corrado (“Inspector Corrado” or “Corrado”) at USPIS‟s 
Harrisburg, PA branch, about their suspicions concerning the 
Parcel.  Corrado agreed to investigate, and the Phoenix 
USPIS sent him the Parcel in Harrisburg.  
 Corrado received the Parcel the next morning (July 22, 
2010).  That same day, with the assistance of the 
Pennsylvania state police, USPIS conducted various name 
and address verifications and other database checks 
concerning the Parcel‟s addressee and destination address.  
Corrado determined that “Derek Brown” was not a person 
known to receive mail at the residence.  Corrado testified that 
the use of a fictitious name is indicative of narcotics 
trafficking.  (J.A. 235.)   
 Since Corrado was the “only one working narcotics in 
Harrisburg,” (J.A. 237) he relied on state police to assist with 
the investigation.  Corrado requested the use of the state 
police‟s trained narcotics canine, which was able to detect the 
presence of narcotics in the Parcel.  With that information, 
Corrado requested that the state police‟s criminal 
investigation bureau reconnoiter at the Parcel‟s destination, 
and gather intelligence about its recipients.   
 Corrado then presented the foregoing facts to the U.S. 
Attorney‟s Office, who, in turn, decided to apply for a search 
warrant to open the Parcel.  Later that day, Corrado sent 
Assistant U.S. Attorney Daryl Bloom (“AUSA Bloom”) a 
draft affidavit in support of the search warrant.   
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 The next day (July 23, 2010), Corrado was on pre-
approved leave from work, and was scheduled to return to 
work on Monday, July 26.  AUSA Bloom arranged for United 
States Magistrate Judge Smyser (“U.S.M.J. Smyser”) to 
review a draft of the search warrant application ahead of 
Monday morning, so that it could be executed as soon as 
Corrado returned.    
 On Monday morning (July 26, 2010), Inspector 
Corrado and AUSA Bloom conferred with U.S.M.J. Smyser, 
Corrado swore to the truth of his affidavit, and a search 
warrant for the Parcel was issued.  Within a half-hour of 
obtaining the warrant, Inspector Corrado returned to USPIS‟s 
Harrisburg office, and opened the Parcel.  The Parcel 
contained approximately twenty pounds of marijuana.   
 Following this discovery, members of the USPIS, 
Pennsylvania State Police, and Cumberland County Drug 
Task Force, assembled into a team of approximately twelve 
(the “Controlled Delivery and Search Team” or the “Team”) 
for the purpose of carrying out a controlled delivery of the 
Parcel.   
 Before conducting the controlled delivery, the Team 
reconstructed the Parcel.    They replaced the twenty pounds 
of marijuana with a “representative sample” and sham 
material to represent the original weight of the Parcel.  (J.A. 
242.)  In addition, the officers placed indicator equipment, 
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with GPS capability, into the Parcel to keep track of it, and to 
be alerted when the Parcel was opened.
2
 
 The same day, Pennsylvania State Trooper Brian 
Overcash (“Trooper Overcash”), one of the agents assisting 
with surveillance and intelligence gathering and a member of 
the Controlled Delivery and Search Team, obtained the 
Anticipatory Warrant from MDJ Martin.  Corrado testified 
that the Anticipatory Warrant was obtained by Trooper 
Overcash to expedite delivery of the Parcel.  (J.A. 260.)  
Trooper Overcash‟s affidavit in support of the warrant 
(“Overcash‟s Affidavit”) stated in relevant part:  
 [A] Federal Search and Seizure Warrant 
was executed on the parcel.  The parcel 
contained approximately 20 pounds of 
suspected marijuana.  The marijuana was field 
tested with positive results.  
 [] It has been the experience of [Trooper 
Overcash], that the amount of marijuana seized, 
is of a quantity consistent with possession with 
intent to deliver.  It has also been the experience 
of your Affiant that persons involved in the sale 
of Controlled Substances also have in their 
possession, or close proximity, other Controlled 
substances, paraphernalia, and records, 
proceeds associated with the sale of controlled 
substances. 
                                                 
2
 Corrado obtained a tracking warrant from U.S.M.J. Smyser 
on July 26 at 11:05 a.m. (J.A. 258.)  The parties have not 
raised any issues with this warrant.   
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 [] Your affiant requests that an 
Anticipatory Search Warrant be granted for the 
residence at 237 West Locust St, 
Mechanicsburg, PA.  This warrant will only be 
executed pending a successful controlled 
delivery of the package. (Package taken inside 
residence).  Additionally the package will 
transmit an audible beep to Officer‟s [sic] when 
the package is opened.  
(J.A. 177.)  Trooper Overcash‟s Affidavit did not specify that 
the twenty pounds of marijuana had been replaced by a trace 
amount of marijuana and sham material.  Nevertheless, the 
Anticipatory Warrant authorized a search of the residence, 
upon completion of the delivery of the Parcel to the residence, 
and once the indicator equipment alerted the Controlled 
Delivery and Search Team that someone had opened the 
Parcel.   
 On the same day that MDJ Martin issued the 
Anticipatory Warrant, a USPIS Postal Inspector disguised as 
a letter carrier and wearing a wire, hand-delivered the 
reconstructed Parcel to the residence.  At the time of delivery, 
Elijah Small (“Small”) answered the door, and when the 
undercover inspector asked for Derek Brown, Small went to 
find him.  Golson‟s son, Corey Jamal Golson (“CJG”), next 
appeared at the door.  The undercover inspector announced to 
CJG, “I have a parcel here for Derek Brown.  Are you Derek 
Brown?”  (J.A. 52.)  CJG replied, “Yes” (id. at 52) and 
proceeded to sign for the Parcel as Derek Brown.  CJG then 
took the Parcel into the residence.   
 Approximately thirty minutes later, the indicator 
equipment alerted the Controlled Delivery and Search Team 
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that the Parcel was opened.  Both Pennsylvania state law 
enforcement agents, and federal agents—all members of the 
Team—entered the residence.  They found CJG in the kitchen 
next to the Parcel, and Small and Charles Richardson on the 
second floor of the residence.  Pennsylvania state law 
enforcement issued Miranda rights to all three individuals 
and took them into their custody.   
 Acting on the Anticipatory Warrant, the Controlled 
Delivery and Search Team searched all three floors of 
Golson‟s residence.  The following items were seized from 
CJG‟s bedroom: a handgun, a sawed-off /short-barreled 
shotgun, and ammunition.  (J.A. 179-80.)  The Team found 
the following items in the recording studio room adjacent to 
CJG‟s bedroom: ammunition, including hollow point bullets, 
704 packets of heroin packaged for distribution, forty grams 
of raw heroin, a cutting agent, packaging material consistent 
with drug distribution, a heat sealer, heat sealable bags, a 
scale, rubber examination gloves, and masks.  (Id.)  In the 
second floor bedroom, determined to be that of Golson, the 
Team found the following items: a handgun, a shotgun, 100 
packets of heroin, rolling papers, and a marijuana grinder.  
(Id.)  The heroin and marijuana field-tested positive.  The 
Pennsylvania State Police took custody of all the seized 
items.   
 The record reflects that the Parcel was intended for 
Golson, and although CJG represented himself as Derek 
Brown to the undercover inspector, he did so only under 
Golson‟s instruction.  (J.A. 117.) 
 Ultimately, the U.S. government brought charges 
against CJG, although, initially there was a state prosecution.  
CJG cooperated with law enforcement by agreeing to testify 
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against Golson in the instant case.  CJG received a 78-month 
term of imprisonment as a result of his cooperation.
3
   
B. Procedural Background 
 Golson entered a plea of not guilty on a three-count 
indictment charging him with: (1) criminal conspiracy to 
distribute and possess with intent to distribute marijuana and 
heroin, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846; (2) distribution and 
possession with intent to distribute marijuana and heroin, in 
violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(C), (b)(1)(D) and 
18 U.S.C. § 2; and (3) possession of a firearm during and in 
relation to a drug trafficking crime, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 
§ 924(c)(1)(A), (c)(1)(B)(I).  
 Golson filed a motion to suppress the seizure of 
evidence allegedly obtained through two separate Fourth 
Amendment violations.  First, Golson argues that the search 
of the residence: (1) violated Rule 41(b) because MDJ 
Martin, who is not a federal judge or a judge of a state court 
of record, issued the Anticipatory Warrant; and (2) was 
unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment because the 
warrant was obtained based on Trooper Overcash‟s Affidavit 
that contained misleading material facts.  Second, Golson 
argues that because Inspector Corrado retained possession of 
the Parcel for four days before seeking a warrant to open it, 
the seizure was unreasonable.  
 After the suppression motion was denied, Golson 
entered a conditional guilty plea to the three-count indictment 
                                                 
3
 The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania also brought charges 
against Small and Richardson.   
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pursuant to Rule 11(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Criminal 
Procedure.  Under the conditional plea, Golson reserved the 
right to appeal the adverse determinations of his motion to 
suppress.  
 The District Court sentenced Golson to 161 months of 
imprisonment, three years of supervised release, and issued 
an assessment fee of $300.00 and a fine of $1,000.00.  
Golson‟s appeal of the District Court‟s denial of his motion 
for suppression is now before us. 
II. JURISDICTION 
 The District Court had jurisdiction to hear this case 
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231.  We have jurisdiction pursuant 
to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.   
III. ANALYSIS  
A. Suppression of Evidence Obtained Pursuant to the 
Anticipatory Warrant 
 The Fourth Amendment protects individuals from 
unreasonable searches and seizures.  U.S. Const. amend. IV.  
“It remains a cardinal principle that searches conducted 
outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge 
or magistrate, [i.e., without a warrant,] are per se 
unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment.”  California v. 
Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 580 (1991) (internal quotation marks 
and citations omitted); United States v. Robertson, 305 F.3d 
164, 167 (3d Cir. 2002) (“Generally, for a seizure to be 
reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, it must be 
effectuated with a warrant based on probable cause.”). 
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 “[T]he ultimate measure of the constitutionality of a 
governmental search is reasonableness[,]” Maryland v. King, 
133 S. Ct. 1958, 1969 (2013) (internal quotation marks 
omitted); however, absent special circumstances, law 
enforcement agents must obtain a warrant from a neutral 
magistrate based on probable cause.  See id.; Treasury 
Employees v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 667 (1989).  For 
federal prosecutorial purposes, a valid warrant must also 
comply with the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.  See 
Fed. R. Crim. P. 1(a).  
 Golson contends that the District Court erred in failing 
to suppress the evidence obtained pursuant to the 
Anticipatory Warrant.  In support of this contention, Golson 
reiterates his arguments from the original suppression 
hearing.  First, the warrant is invalid because the government 
failed to have a federal judge or a judge of a Pennsylvania 
court of record issue the warrant, as required by Rule 41(b).  
Second, the Anticipatory Warrant is invalid because the 
warrant application contained a material misrepresentation of 
fact.  Because both of these arguments lack merit, we will 
affirm the District Court‟s denial of Golson‟s motion to 
suppress.  
a. The Anticipatory Warrant is not Subject to Rule 
41(b)  
 We begin with Golson‟s first argument that the 
government violated Rule 41(b) when it obtained the 
Anticipatory Warrant from MDJ Martin.  As a threshold 
matter, we must consider whether Rule 41(b) is applicable to 
the Anticipatory Warrant, and if so, whether MDJ Martin is a 
judge of a state court of record.  Fed. R. Crim. P. 41(b).  
Because these questions require the interpretation of Rule 
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41(b), we exercise plenary review.  United States v. Toliver, 
330 F.3d 607, 610 (3d Cir. 2003).  For the reasons set forth 
below, we find that the Anticipatory Warrant is not subject to 
the mandates of Rule 41(b); as such, the dispute as to whether 
MDJ Martin is a judge of a state court of record is moot.
4
 
 To put this dispute in context, Rule 41(b) grants the 
authority to issue search warrants to federal judges and judges 
of state courts of record.  Fed. R. Crim. P. 41(b).
5
  In a federal 
prosecution, Rule 41(b) will apply, by its own terms, to a 
search warrant made “[a]t the request of a federal law 
enforcement officer or an attorney for the [federal] 
government[.]”  Fed. R. Crim. P. 41.  In the Third Circuit, 
Rule 41(b) also applies to warrants made at the request of a 
non-federal law enforcement officer or non-government 
attorney, if the federal court reviewing the warrant deems the 
                                                 
4
  Parenthetically, MDJ Martin is not a judge of a state court 
of record.  See 42 Pa. Const. Stat. §§ 301, 321 (2006). 
 
5
 Specifically, Rule 41(b) provides that:  
 
[a]t the request of a federal law enforcement 
officer or an attorney for the government: (1) a 
magistrate judge with authority in the district—
or if none is reasonably available, a judge of a 
state court of record in the district—has 
authority to issue a warrant to search for and 
seize a person or property located within the 
district. 
Fed. R. Crim. P. 41. 
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search to be “federal” in character.6  See United States v. 
Bedford, 519 F.2d 650, 654 n.1 (3d Cir. 1975).  Indeed “[i]f 
the search is deemed federal in character, the legality of the 
search would be conditioned upon a finding that the warrant 
satisfied federal constitutional requirements and certain 
provisions of Fed. R. Crim. P. 41 designed to protect the 
integrity of the federal courts or to govern the conduct of 
federal officers.”  Id. at 656 n.1 (internal quotation marks and 
citations omitted) (emphasis added). 
 On the other hand, Rule 41(b) will not apply to a 
search warrant made at the request of someone other than a 
                                                 
6
 The Fourth, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits similarly interpret 
Rule 41(b) to apply where a search made pursuant to a 
warrant is “federal” in character.  See United States v. 
Johnson, 451 F.2d 1321, 1322 (4th Cir. 1971); United States 
v. MacConnell, 868 F.2d 281, 283 (8th Cir. 1989); United 
States v. McCain, 677 F.2d 657, 662 (8th Cir. 1982) (“Rule 
41 applies only where a warrant is sought by a federal law 
enforcement officer or where the search can otherwise be 
characterized as federal in character”); United States v. 
Bookout, 810 F.2d 965, 967 (10th Cir. 1987).   
 On the other hand, the Fifth Circuit reads Rule 41(b) 
literally, and requires compliance with the mandates of Rule 
41 only when a warrant is made “[a]t the request of a federal 
law enforcement officer or an attorney for the government.”  
United States v. McKeever, 905 F.2d 829, 832 (5th Cir. 1990) 
(citing Fed. R. Crim. P. 41(b)(1)).   
 Under either approach, Rule 41 does not apply to the 
Anticipatory Warrant here.   
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federal law enforcement officer or government attorney when 
the resulting search is “state” in character, even if the fruits of 
that warrant are later entered into evidence in a federal 
prosecution.  Id. at 653-54.  In that situation, “the warrant, 
assuming proper issuance under state law, need only conform 
to federal constitutional requirements.”7  Bedford, 519 F.2d at 
654 n.1. 
 Whether a search can be characterized as either state or 
federal is a fact-intensive inquiry that looks at “the extent [to 
which] federal officers were involved in the search and 
seizure.”  Id. at 654 n.1 (citing Lustig v. United States, 338 
U.S. 74, 81 (1949); Byars v. United States, 273 U.S. 28, 32 
(1927) (“[T]he court must be vigilant to scrutinize the 
attendant facts with an eye to detect and a hand to prevent 
violations of the Constitution by circuitous and indirect 
methods.”)).  
 To determine the warrant‟s validity, we must focus on 
the facts regarding the character of the search in their totality.  
Bedford, 519 F.2d at 654 n.1.  In Bedford, although agents 
from both the state and federal government assisted in 
executing the search warrant, we deemed the search state in 
character based on assessing the following eight factors: 
(1) the warrant was issued under state law and 
directed to state officers; (2) the warrant was 
predicated on probable violation of state 
                                                 
7
 Pennsylvania law grants MDJ Martin the authority to issue 
search warrants, and the parties do not otherwise contest that 
the warrant is invalid under state law.  See 42 Pa. Const. Stat. 
§ 1515 (2006). 
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narcotics laws; (3) there was no evidence of bad 
faith on the part of either the state or federal 
officers; (4) federal agents did not assist in the 
obtaining of the warrant; (5) there was no 
evidence that federal agents instigated or 
supervised the search; (6) defendant was 
initially arrested by local police officers; (7) the 
majority of the evidence was found by local 
officers; and (8) the products of the search, 
placed in the custody of local police, formed the 
basis of a state prosecution. 
Id. at 654.  The Bedford Court was “more inclined to view the 
search as a „state‟ undertaking in which federal agents 
participated solely to supply additional manpower for the 
execution of the warrant.”  Id. at 654 n.1.  
 Applying the factors set forth in Bedford, we find that 
the search of Golson‟s residence was state in character.  The 
Anticipatory Warrant was issued by MDJ Martin upon state 
Trooper Overcash‟s application (factor 1); the Anticipatory 
Warrant indicated that there was a violation of Pennsylvania‟s 
Controlled Substance, Drug Device and Cosmetic Act, 35 Pa. 
Cons. Stat.  § 780-113 (2004) (factor 2); Golson failed to 
show bad faith of federal or state officers in obtaining the 
Anticipatory Warrant in state court (factor 3); while federal 
officers may have assisted in laying the groundwork for the 
Anticipatory Warrant, Trooper Overcash championed the 
effort to obtain the warrant (factor 4); there is no indication 
that federal agents supervised the search (factor 5); and lastly, 
despite federal and state officers working together during the 
search of the residence, the seized evidence was placed into 
the custody of the state police (factors 7 and 8).  In 
consideration of all the above factors, we agree with the 
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District Court that the search was state in character.  Based on 
this finding, the Anticipatory Warrant is not subject to Rule 
41 scrutiny.   
b. There was a Substantial Basis for MDJ Martin to 
Find Probable Cause to Issue the Anticipatory Warrant  
 Golson‟s second argument regarding the Anticipatory 
Warrant is that Trooper Overcash‟s Affidavit in support of the 
Anticipatory Warrant cannot sustain a finding of probable 
cause.   
 A reviewing court may not conduct a de novo review 
of a probable cause determination.  Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 
213, 236 (1983); United States v. Conley, 4 F.3d 1200, 1205 
(3d Cir. 1993).  Here, we must apply the same deferential 
standard as the District Court in reviewing MDJ Martin‟s 
initial probable cause determination.  Conley, 4 F.3d at 1205.  
Our duty is “to ensure that the magistrate had a substantial 
basis for . . . conclud[ing] that probable cause existed.”  Id. at 
1205 (alterations in original) (internal quotation marks 
omitted).  In making a probable cause determination, the 
judge issuing the warrant looks at whether “there is a fair 
probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be 
found in a particular place,” Gates, 462 U.S. 238, and thus, 
here, we must “uphold the warrant as long as there is a 
substantial basis for a fair probability that evidence will be 
found.”  Conley, 4 F.3d at 1205; see also United States v. 
Stearn, 598 F.3d 540, 554 (3d Cir. 2009).  
 Here, Golson submits that Trooper Overcash‟s 
Affidavit, (1) omits the fact that law enforcement agents 
replaced the twenty pounds of marijuana found in the Parcel 
with trace amounts of marijuana, and (2) “lacks a specific 
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triggering condition sufficiently specific to comply with [all 
the warrant requirements.]”  (Appellant Br. 16-17.)  Both of 
these arguments fail. 
 First, MDJ Martin‟s finding of probable cause is not 
undermined by Trooper Overcash‟s omission from his 
affidavit that the Parcel would contain only a trace amount of 
marijuana at delivery.  As discussed below, even when we 
“remove the falsehood created by [the] omission by supplying 
the omitted information to the original affidavit[,]” U.S. v. 
Yusuf, 461 F.3d 374, 384 (3d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation 
marks omitted), a substantial basis existed for MDJ Martin to 
find probable cause.  See Wilson v. Russo, 212 F.3d 781, 789 
(3d Cir. 2000) (reasoning that if the affidavit excised of 
offending inaccuracies, and including omitted facts, has 
probable cause, then “even if there had not been omissions 
and misrepresentation[s],” the warrant would have been 
issued).   
 Golson‟s second argument, that the Anticipatory 
Warrant “lacks a specific triggering condition sufficiently 
specific to comply with [warrant requirements]” also fails.  
(Appellant Br. 17.)  An anticipatory search warrant is “a 
warrant based upon an affidavit showing probable cause that 
at some future time (but not presently) certain evidence of 
crime will be located at a specified place.”  United States v. 
Grubbs, 547 U.S. 90, 94 (2006) (internal quotation marks and 
citations omitted).  
 For an anticipatory warrant based on a triggering 
event, the Supreme Court requires satisfaction of two 
“prerequisites of probability” to comply with the Fourth 
Amendment‟s probable cause requirement.  Grubbs, 547 U.S. 
at 96.  The first prerequisite of probability requires that, 
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“based on facts existing when the warrant is issued[,]” there is 
“probable cause to believe the contraband, which is not yet at 
the place to be searched, will be there when the warrant is 
executed.”  United States v. Loy, 191 F.3d 360, 365 (3d Cir. 
1999); see also Grubbs, 547 U.S. at 96-97 (“[I]f the 
triggering condition occurs there is a fair probability that 
contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a 
particular place[.]”) (internal quotation marks and citation 
omitted).  This requirement ensures that there is a sufficient 
nexus between the contraband to be seized and the place to be 
searched.  Grubbs, 547 U.S. at 96.   
 The second prerequisite of probability is that there is 
probable cause to believe that the triggering event will 
actually occur.  Grubbs, 547 U.S. at 97.  “The supporting 
affidavit must provide the [judge] with sufficient information 
to evaluate both aspects of the probable-cause determination.”  
Id. at 97. 
 Here, the first probable cause requirement is met.  In 
addition to the trace amount of marijuana certain to be present 
in the residence at the time of the warrant‟s execution, there 
was also a fair probability that “other controlled substances, 
paraphernalia, and records . . . associated with the sale of 
controlled substances” would be present.  (J.A. 177); see 
Stearn, 597 F.3d at 559-60 (stating the nexus may be 
established by “the conclusions of experienced officers 
regarding where evidence of a crime is likely to be found[.]”); 
see, e.g., Grubbs, 547 U.S. at 97 (finding the successful 
controlled delivery of contraband consisting of a videotape of 
child pornography would “plainly establish” probable cause 
for the search).  
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 Because Trooper Overcash possessed the Parcel 
containing trace amounts of marijuana and had definite plans 
to deliver the Parcel to the residence, the second probable 
cause requirement is also met, as there was a fair probability 
that the triggering event, i.e., the Parcel‟s entrance into the 
residence after a successful controlled delivery and the 
subsequent alert of the indicator equipment, would actually 
occur.
8
  See Grubbs, 547 U.S. at 97.  In Grubbs, the Supreme 
Court found that the successful delivery of contraband 
consisting of videotapes of child pornography to defendant‟s 
residence by an undercover agent would satisfy the second 
probable cause requirement because, while it was “possible 
that [defendant] could have refused delivery of the videotape 
he had ordered, that was unlikely.”  Id. at 97.  Similarly, here, 
while it was possible the occupants of the residence would 
refuse delivery of the Parcel, or accept delivery but leave the 
Parcel unopened, it was more probable they would accept and 
open.    
B. Suppression of Evidence Obtained After Four-Day 
Warrantless Seizure 
 Golson‟s second argument on appeal is that the 
District Court erred in finding the four-day warrantless 
seizure of the Parcel to be reasonable.
 9
  (Appellant Br. 21.)  
                                                 
8
 Trooper Overcash‟s Affidavit states: “This warrant will only 
be executed pending a successful controlled delivery of the 
package. (Package taken inside residence).  Additionally the 
package will transmit an audible beep to Officer‟s [sic] when 
the package is opened.”  (J.A. 177.)  
9
 The government argues for the first time on appeal that 
Golson lacks standing to challenge the search of the Parcel 
 20 
The District Court disagreed, and held that the “four-day 
                                                                                                             
because he has no privacy interest in it; Golson neither sent 
the parcel nor was it addressed to him.  The government 
evokes the general principles of Fourth Amendment standing 
established in United States v. Padilla, 508 U.S. 77 (1993), 
and Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143 (1978), to support 
this argument.  However, these cases cannot overcome or 
conflict with our precedent that the government may not raise 
a Fourth Amendment standing argument for the first time on 
appeal.  United States v. Stearn, 597 F.3d 540, 552 n.11 (3d 
Cir. 2010).  “The „standing‟ inquiry, in the Fourth 
Amendment context, is shorthand for the determination of 
whether a litigant‟s Fourth Amendment rights have been 
implicated.”  United States v. Mosley, 454 F.3d 249, 253 n.5 
(2006).  As we previously explained:  
Fourth Amendment standing is one element of a 
Fourth Amendment claim, and does not 
implicate federal jurisdiction.  Consequently, 
standing can be conceded by the government, 
and it is also subject to the ordinary rule that an 
argument not raised in the district court is 
waived on appeal. 
 Id. at 552 n.11 (internal citations and quotation marks 
omitted); see, e.g., United States v. Navedo, 694 F.3d 463, 
478 n.3 (3d Cir. 2012) (“[W]hether [defendant] possessed a 
reasonable expectation of privacy—a necessary predicate to 
his invocation of the exclusionary rule—might have presented 
a close question in this case.  But the Government waived this 
standing argument by failing to raise it in the District Court.”) 
(internal citations omitted).   
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delay due to the investigation, scheduled leave, and the 
weekend is reasonable in the present case.”  (J.A. 6.)  We 
review the District Court‟s factual findings for clear error, 
and exercise plenary review over the District Court‟s 
determination that the seizure did not violate the Fourth 
Amendment.  United States v. Johnson, 592 F.3d 442, 447 
(3d Cir. 2010) (citing United States v. Myers, 308 F.3d 251, 
255 (3d Cir. 2002); United States v. Bonner, 363 F.3d 213, 
215 (3d Cir. 2004)).  We agree that the four-day seizure was 
reasonable.   
 Postal authorities may seize and detain mailed items 
for a reasonable amount of time, if they have a reasonable 
suspicion of criminal activity.
10
  United States v. Van 
Leeuwen, 397 U.S. 249, 251-52 (1970).  We look at the 
totality of the circumstances in determining whether the 
length of the detention was reasonable.  See Id. at 252 (“The 
nature and weight of the packages, the fictitious return 
address, and the British Columbia license plates of respondent 
who made the mailings in this border town certainly justified 
                                                 
10
 Golson does not dispute that the detention of the Parcel was 
based on reasonable suspicion, nor could he, because 
reasonable suspicion to detain the Parcel is supported by the 
record: the Parcel‟s return address was fictitious and non-
deliverable, and based on the past experience of the USPIS 
inspectors involved, narcotics are often brought across the 
border from Mexico into Arizona and then mailed to the east 
coast.  Moreover, the addressee, Derek Brown, was not a 
person known to receive mail at the address listed, which is 
one possible indicia of narcotics trafficking. 
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detention, without a warrant, while an investigation was 
made.”).   
 Here, the length of the delay was reasonable because it 
was due to the investigation, scheduled leave, and the 
weekend, when postal operations, in ordinary course, cease or 
slow down considerably.  See United States v Lux, 905 F.2d 
1379 (10th Cir. 1990) (detaining a package for approximately 
a day and a half, when one of those days was a Sunday, was 
reasonable); United States v. Mayomi, 873 F.2d 1049 (7th Cir. 
1989) (detaining letters over a weekend for the sole purpose 
of subjecting them to a canine sniff test was not 
unreasonable); United States v. Gill, 280 F.3d 923 (9th Cir. 
2002) (six-day delay where postal worker who was on leave 
for three days, was not unreasonable).  Therefore, Golson‟s 
argument is without merit and we will affirm the District 
Court‟s finding that the Parcel was not unreasonably seized. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
 For the reasons discussed above, we will affirm the 
District Court‟s denial of Golson‟s motion to suppress 
evidence discovered in Golson‟s residence, and in the Parcel.   
